Aquilante, Tommaso (2015): Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US.
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Abstract
Antidumping (AD) is the most widely used contingent protection measure. In the United States, key decisions on AD are delegated to the International Trade Commission (ITC), an independent agency composed of six non-elected commissioners. Using a newly collected dataset, I study the determinants of all final ITC votes on AD during the 1980-2010 period. Contrary to the view that ITC commissioners are bureaucrats who simply follow technical rules, I find that their decisions crucially depend on which party has appointed them (the selection effect) and on the trade policy interests of key senators in that party (the pressure effect): whether (Democratic) Republican-appointed commissioners vote in favor of AD depends crucially on whether the petitioning industry is key (in terms of employment) in the states represented by leading (Democratic) Republican senators.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US |
English Title: | Bureaucrats or Politicians? Political Parties and Antidumping in the US |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Antidumping policy, Political parties |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F10 - General F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F13 - Trade Policy ; International Trade Organizations F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy |
Item ID: | 70359 |
Depositing User: | Dr Tommaso Aquilante |
Date Deposited: | 01 Apr 2016 17:07 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 20:44 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/70359 |