Currarini, Sergio and Marini, Marco A. (2012): On the Effect of Premia and Penalties on the Optimal Portfolio Choice. Published in: International Journal of Contemporary Mathematical Sciences , Vol. 47, No. 7 (October 2012): pp. 2341-2344.
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Abstract
In a standard portfolio choice between a risky and a safe asset, we study the effect of imposing premia and penalties conditional on the realized return of the portfolio meeting a given threshold. We show that thresholds set at ”intermediate levels” have the effect to increase the optimal share of the safe asset, while very low and very high thresholds may induce larger shares of the risky investment if a condition on the curvature of the utility function holds.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | On the Effect of Premia and Penalties on the Optimal Portfolio Choice |
English Title: | On the Effect of Premia and Penalties on the Optimal Portfolio Choice |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Portfolio, Premium, Risk Aversion |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C5 - Econometric Modeling C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling D - Microeconomics > D0 - General G - Financial Economics > G0 - General M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M0 - General M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M0 - General > M00 - General |
Item ID: | 70726 |
Depositing User: | Prof Marco Marini |
Date Deposited: | 15 Apr 2016 07:20 |
Last Modified: | 16 Oct 2019 07:10 |
References: | R. Gibbons, K.J., Murphy,(1992), "Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: theory and evidence", Journal of Political Economy, 100, 468-505; M. Jensen, K.J., Murphy,(1990), "Performance pay and top-management incentives", Journal of Political Economy,98, 225-262. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/70726 |