Bhowmik, Anuj and Centrone, Francesca and Martellotti, Anna
(2016):
*Coalitional Extreme Desirability in Finitely Additive Economies with Asymmetric Information.*

Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_71084.pdf Download (415kB) | Preview |

## Abstract

We prove a coalitional core-Walras equivalence theorem for an asymmetric information exchange economy with a finitely additive measure space of agents, finitely many states of nature, and an infinite dimensional commodity space having the Radon-Nikodym property and whose positive cone has possibly empty interior. The result is based on a new cone condition, firstly developed in Centrone and Martellotti (2015), called coalitional extreme desirability. As a consequence, we also derive a new individualistic core-Walras equivalence result.

Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|

Original Title: | Coalitional Extreme Desirability in Finitely Additive Economies with Asymmetric Information |

English Title: | Coalitional Extreme Desirability in Finitely Additive Economies with Asymmetric Information |

Language: | English |

Keywords: | Asymmetric information; Coalitional economies; Core-Walras equivalence; Extremely desirable commodity; Finitely additive measure; Walrasian expectation equilibria; Private core; Radon-Nikodym property. |

Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D51 - Exchange and Production Economies D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design |

Item ID: | 71084 |

Depositing User: | Dr. Anuj Bhowmik |

Date Deposited: | 08 May 2016 06:01 |

Last Modified: | 02 Oct 2019 10:51 |

References: | [1] C.D. Aliprantis, R. Tourky, N.C. Yannelis, Cone Conditions in General Equilibrium Theory, J. Econ. Theory 92 (2000), 96-121. [2] B. Allen, Market games with asymmetric information: the core, Econ. Theory 29 (2006),465-487. [3] L. Angeloni, A. Martellotti, A separation result with applications to Edgeworth equivalence in some infinite dimensional setting, Commentationes Math. 44 (2004) 227-243. [4] L. Angeloni , V. F. Martins-da-Rocha, Large economies with asymmetric information and without free disposal, Econ. Theory 38 (2009), 263-286. [5] T.E. Armstrong, M.K. Richter, The Core-Walras equivalence , J. Econ. Theory 33 (1984), 116-151. [6] A. Basile, Finitely additive nonatomic coalition production economies: Core-Walras equivalence, Internat. Econ. Rev. 34 (1993) 983-995. [7] A. Basile, C. Donnini, M.G. Graziano, Core and equilibria in coalitional asymmetric information economies, J. Math. Econ. 45 (2009), 293-307. [8] K.P.S. Bhaskara Rao, M. Bhaskara Rao, Theory of Charges, Academic Press, 1983. [9] A. Bhowmik, J. Cao, Blocking efficiency in an economy with asymmetric information, J. Math. Econ. 48 (2012), 396-403. [10] A. Bhowmik, J. Cao, Robust efficiency in mixed economies with asymmetric information, J. Math. Econ. 49 (2013), 49-57. [11] A. Bhowmik, Core and coalitional fairness: the case of information sharing rules, Econ Theory 60 (2015), 461-494. [12] A. Bhowmik, Edgeworth equilibria: separable and non separable commodity space, MPRA report 46796 (2013), http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46796/ [13] F. Centrone, A. Martellotti, Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive exchange economies, Econ. Theory Bull. 4 (2016), 17-34. [14] G. Chichilnisky, P.J. Kalman, Application of functional analysis to models of efficient allocation of economic resources, J. Optimization Theory Appl. 30 (1980), 19-32. [15] G. Debreu, Preference functions on measure spaces of economic agents, Econometrica, 35 (1967), 111-122. [16] J. Diestel, J.J. Jr. Uhl, Vector Measures, American Mathematical Society, Providence (1977). [17] E. Einy, D. Moreno, B.Shitovitz, Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differentiated information, Econ. Theory 18 (2001), 321-332. [18] O. Evren, F. Husseinov, Theorems on the core of an economy with infinitely many commodities and consumers, J. Math. Econ. 44 (2008), 1180-1196. [19] F. Forges, E. Minelli, R. Vohra, Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey, J. Math. Econ. 38 (2002), 1-41. [20] M.G. Graziano, C. Meo, The Aubin private core of differential information economies, Decis. Econ. Finance 28 (2005), 9-38. [21] M. Greinecker, K., Podczeck, Liapounov's vector measure theorems in Banach spaces and applications to general equilibrium theory, Econ. Theory Bull. 1 (2013), 157-173. [22] C. Herves-Beloso, C. Meo, E. Moreno-Garcia, Information and size of coalitions, Econ. Thoery 55 (2014), 545-563. [23] A. Martellotti, Finitely additive economies with free extremely desirable commodities, J. Math. Econ. 44 (2007) 535-549. [24] A. Mas-Colell, The equilibrium existence problem in topological vector lattices, Econometrica 54 (1986), 1039-1053. [25] K. Podczek, N. Yannelis, Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and with infinitely many commodities, J. Econ. Theory 1414 (2008), 152-183. [26] R. Radner, Competitive equilibrium under uncertainty, Econometrica 36 (1968), 31-58. [27] A. Rustichini, N.C. Yannelis, Edgeworth's conjecture in economies with a continuum of agents and commodities, J. Math. Econ. 20 (1991), 307-326. [28] K. Vind, Edgeworth allocations in an exchange economy with many traders, Internat. Econ. Review 5 (1964) 165-177. [29] R. Wilson, Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy, Econometrica 46 (1978), 807-816. [30] N. C. Yannelis, The core of an economy with asymmetric information, Econ Theory 1 (1991), 183-197 |

URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/71084 |