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Coalitional Extreme Desirability in Finitely Additive Economies with Asymmetric Information

Bhowmik, Anuj and Centrone, Francesca and Martellotti, Anna (2016): Coalitional Extreme Desirability in Finitely Additive Economies with Asymmetric Information.

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Abstract

We prove a coalitional core-Walras equivalence theorem for an asymmetric information exchange economy with a finitely additive measure space of agents, finitely many states of nature, and an infinite dimensional commodity space having the Radon-Nikodym property and whose positive cone has possibly empty interior. The result is based on a new cone condition, firstly developed in Centrone and Martellotti (2015), called coalitional extreme desirability. As a consequence, we also derive a new individualistic core-Walras equivalence result.

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