Nakazawa, Katsuyoshi and Matsuoka, Hirokazu (2016): Change in Strategic Interaction after Introducing Policy.
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Abstract
This study investigates the change in the strength of strategic interaction from a policy introduction stage to a mature stage. The bulk of literature confirms the strategic interaction among local governments, but does not consider the change in the strength of strategic interaction. Our hypothesis is that the strength of strategic interaction decreases from a policy introduction stage to a mature stage because uncertainty at the policymaking stage might become weaker as time elapses. We focus on the Japanese long-term care insurance (LTCI) system that was introduced in fiscal year 2000. Our findings suggest that since municipalities should forecast the demand for long-term care and set the premium over a three-year “program management period,” they have a strong incentive to refer to the premium setting of surrounding municipalities. Moreover, the incentive would decrease as periods elapse. The empirical evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that the strength of strategic interaction on LTCI premium setting is gradually reduced from the early stage to the mature stage.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Change in Strategic Interaction after Introducing Policy |
English Title: | Change in Strategic Interaction after Introducing Policy |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Spatial autoregressive model; Information spillover; Long-term care insurance; Premium setting; Change in strategic interaction |
Subjects: | H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H75 - State and Local Government: Health ; Education ; Welfare ; Public Pensions H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession P - Economic Systems > P2 - Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies > P25 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R1 - General Regional Economics > R12 - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity |
Item ID: | 73512 |
Depositing User: | Katsuyoshi Nakazawa |
Date Deposited: | 17 Sep 2016 04:24 |
Last Modified: | 02 Oct 2019 16:46 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/73512 |