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Mixed Strategies in Games with Ambiguity Averse Agents

Calford, Evan (2016): Mixed Strategies in Games with Ambiguity Averse Agents.

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Abstract

In normal form games, when agents exhibit ambiguity aversion the exclusion of mixed strategies from agents' choice sets can enlarge the set of equilibria. While it is possible, in a game theoretic experiment, to enforce pure strategy reporting it is not possible to prevent subjects from mixing before reporting a pure strategy. This short paper establishes conditions under which the set of equilibrium in a game with ambiguity averse agents and pure strategy reporting is invariant to the existence of pre-play mixing devices. This result is crucial for the interpretation of recent experimental work on the role of ambiguity aversion in normal form games.

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