Brexit and new perspectives of an unconventional way of Eurozone revival

Nikolaos, Kyriazis and Economou, Emmanouel/Marios/Lazaros (2017): Brexit and new perspectives of an unconventional way of Eurozone revival.

Abstract

In the aftermath of the UK referendum on 23 June, 2016 that resulted in a sonorous negative decision regarding the willingness of the British people to remain in the EU, a significant number of alarming questions have emerged. Although Europe should have forged in crises, nowadays, many compromises have to be made in order to maintain the European construction as intact as possible. The question we attempt to answer is whether a new phase of unconventional monetary policy in the form of QE would be appropriate to lessen the threat of an upcoming crisis. This is why we examine Eurozone QE perspectives through the prism of the new without the UK era of the EU in order to highlight the pros and cons of the historical Brexit decision. As new rounds of unconventional monetary policy are believed to be essential for supporting the weaker countries in the European south, perspectives of non-conventional success could alter and optimal policies be substantially reformulated subject to the newly-arising constraints.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Brexit, European Union, Quantitative Easing, Eurozone
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies; G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G18 - Government Policy and Regulation; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G28 - Government Policy and Regulation; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations

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