Characterizing the Borda ranking rule for a fixed population

Mihara, H. Reiju (2017): Characterizing the Borda ranking rule for a fixed population.

Abstract

A ranking rule (social welfare function) for a fixed population assigns a social preference to each profile of preferences. The rule satisfies "Positional Cancellation" if changes in the relative positions of two alternatives that cancel each other do not alter the social preference between the two. I show that the Borda rule is the only ranking rule that satisfies "Reversal" (a weakening of neutrality), "Positive Responsiveness," and "Pairwise Cancellation."

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Borda rule; Borda count; scoring rules; positional rules; axiomatic characterization
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations

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