Heller, Yuval (2008): All-Stage strong correlated equilbrium.
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Abstract
A strong correlated equilibrium is a strategy profile that is immune to joint deviations. Different notions of strong correlated equilibria were defined in the literature. One major difference among those definitions is the stage in which coalitions can plan a joint deviation: before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the deviating players receive their part of the correlated profile. In this paper we prove that if deviating coalitions are allowed to use new correlating devices, then an ex-ante strong correlated equilibrium is immune to deviations at all stages. Thus the set of ex-ante strong correlated equilibria of Moreno & Wooders (1996) is included in all other sets of strong correlated equilibria.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | All-Stage strong correlated equilbrium |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | correlated equilibrium; strong equilbrium; coaliton-proof equilbrium; ex-ante; ex-post; common knowledge |
| Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games |
| Item ID: | 7903 |
| Depositing User: | Yuval Heller |
| Date Deposited: | 25 Mar 2008 05:32 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 16:40 |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/7903 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Ex-ante and ex-post strong correlated equilbrium. (deposited 12 Mar 2008 16:21)
- All-Stage strong correlated equilbrium. (deposited 25 Mar 2008 05:32) [Currently Displayed]
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