Corporate Voting

Miller, Alan (2017): Corporate Voting.

Abstract

I introduce a model of corporate voting. I characterize the shareholder majority rule as the unique corporate voting rule that satisfies four axioms: anonymity, neutrality, share monotonicity, and merger, a property that requires consistency in election outcomes following stock-for-stock mergers.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Corporate voting, axioms, shareholder majority rule, quotas rules, merger, one share-one vote
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K22 - Business and Securities Law

References

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