Patterns of Rebellion: A Model with Three Challengers

Nakao, Keisuke (2017): Patterns of Rebellion: A Model with Three Challengers.

Abstract

This study proposes a dynamic model of rebellion, where three players individually decide to challenge their common adversary. It is formally demonstrated that the pattern of rebellion is determined endogenously, depending on the challengers' resolve and strength. In other words, a stronger challenger with more resolve tends to fight earlier than others do.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: bandwagoning, strategic coordination, rebellion
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions

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