War and Conflict in Economics: Theories, Applications, and Recent Trends

Kimbrough, Erik and Laughren, Kevin and Sheremeta, Roman (2017): War and Conflict in Economics: Theories, Applications, and Recent Trends. Forthcoming in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Abstract

We review the main economic models of war and conflict. These models vary in details, but their implications are qualitatively consistent, highlighting key commonalities across a variety of conflict settings. Recent empirical literature, employing both laboratory and field data, in many cases confirms the basic implications of conflict theory. However, this literature also presents important challenges to the way economists traditionally model conflict. We finish our review by suggesting ways to address these challenges.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: conflict, war, contest, all-pay auction, war of attrition
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F52 - National Security ; Economic Nationalism; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F54 - Colonialism ; Imperialism ; Postcolonialism; H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H56 - National Security and War; N - Economic History > N4 - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q34 - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts

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