Evaluations of endogenous efficiency of the norm

Sokolovskyi, Dmytro (2017): Evaluations of endogenous efficiency of the norm.

Abstract

In this article the problem of evaluation the efficiency of formal norm is examined. To this purpose the existing definitions of the notion “norm” are analyzed and summarized, their insufficient formalization is noted, whereupon with the approach, using the apparatus of theory of sets and Boolean algebra, a strict definition of the norm, which includes static and dynamic components, is proposed. The description of the norm is extended by the definition of the space of the norm – a group of notions related to the norm. It’s substantiated that these notions shouldn’t be regarded as component parts of the norm. The methods of evaluation the endogenous efficiency of formal norm (rule), basing on an analysis of its internal characteristics, but not on the results of its application is proposed. It’s suggested to determine the quality of the norm at three ways: norm as itself; accordance of the new norm to current ones; easiness of its compliance and easiness of its control. This approach allows identifying potential problematic points of the norm that can lead to difficulties in the future. Using the proposed methods of evaluation of formal norm in areas, where such norms are developed actively (e.g. jurisprudence), can increase the quality of projectable norms, thus reducing costs to their further support. For the already existing norms those methods allow determining their weaknesses. In the theoretical-economic research the apparatus of formalization of norms may be useful in examination of institutional dynamics – namely, the process of institutional change.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: norms; institutions; efficiency; evaluation; compliance; deviation; opportunistic behavior; mathematical economics
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General > C02 - Mathematical Methods; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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