King of the Hill Positional Dynamics in Contests

Mehlum, Halvor and Moene, Kalle (2008): King of the Hill Positional Dynamics in Contests.

Abstract

In a contest with positional dynamics between an incumbent and a challenger i) inequality of power may magnify conflicts, ii) more severe conflicts can go together with lower turnover of incumbents, and iii) power can be self defeating as cost advantages can reduce pay-offs. These three propositions of our paper are contrary to the implications of static conflict models. They follow from incorporating positional dynamics into the standard static approach. Such positional dynamics are relevant for competition in battlefields, politics, and market places.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Contests;political stability;war;incumbency advantage
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games

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