Dictatorship on Top-circular Domains

Achuthankutty, Gopakumar and Roy, Souvik (2017): Dictatorship on Top-circular Domains.

Abstract

We consider domains with a natural property called top-circularity. We show that if such a domain satisfies either the maximal conflict property or the weak conflict property, then it is dictatorial. We obtain the result in Sato (2010) as a corollary. Further, it follows from our results that the union of a top-connected single-peaked domain and a top-connected single-dipped domain is dictatorial.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Dictatorial domains, Top-circularity, Maximal conflict property, Weak conflict property
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design

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