Codetermination: the Necessary Presence of Workers on the Board. A Mathematical Model

Forcillo, Donato (2017): Codetermination: the Necessary Presence of Workers on the Board. A Mathematical Model.

Abstract

We analyse in a firm the possible choice between two systems of corporate governance: the one-tier board, a structure commonly used in the Anglo-American world, and the system of Codetermination, a two-tier board with the presence of workers' representatives in the supervisory board, a model commonly adopted by firms in Germany. The aim is to fill a gap present in the current literature, the absence of a mathematical model that explains how works the governance's system of Codetermination presents not only in the German world, but expanding in many other European countries, as a result of the recent EU directives, which emphasize the need to involve workers in company decisions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Corporate Governance, Codetermination, Labor Representation, Workers, Human Capital, Single Board, One-Tier Board, Monitoring, Welfare
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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