Determinants of Post-congressional Lobbying Employment

Kim, Jin-Hyuk (2012): Determinants of Post-congressional Lobbying Employment. Published in: Economics of Governance , Vol. 2, No. 14 (2013): pp. 107-126.

Abstract

This paper studies the determinants of lobbying-employment decisions of former members of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 105th–108thCongresses. The main empirical findings indicate that there are two groups more likely to become lobbyists: members not re-elected who had more conservative voting records and held important committee assignments and longer-serving members who voluntarily retired and voted less conservatively in their last term compared to their previous terms in office. A decomposition analysis confirms that the revolving doors for the two groups of legislators differ because of differences in employer response rather than in legislator characteristics.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Revolving doors, Lobbying, Post-employment restrictions, U.S. Congress
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor > J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity

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