Munich Personal RePEc Archive

On some decisive players for linear efficient and symmetric values in cooperative games with transferable utility

Nembua Célestin, Chameni and Wendji Clovis, Miamo (2017): On some decisive players for linear efficient and symmetric values in cooperative games with transferable utility.

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Abstract

The main goal of the paper is to shed light on economic allocations issues, in particular by focusing on individuals who receive nothing (that is an amount of zero allocation or payoff). It is worth noting that such individuals may be considered, in some contexts, as poor or socially excluded. To this end, our study relies on the notion of cooperative games with transferable utility and the Linear Efficient and Symmetric values (called LES values) are considered as allocation rules. Null players in Shapley sense are extensively studied ; two broader classes of null players are introduced. The analysis is facilitated by the help of a parametric representation of LES values. It is clearly shown that the control of what a LES value assigns as payoffs to null players gives significant information about the characterization of the value. Several axiomatic characterizations of subclasses of LES values are provided using our approach.

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