Nehring, Klaus and Pivato, Marcus (2018): The median rule in judgement aggregation.

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Abstract
A judgement aggregation rule takes the views of a collection of voters over a set of interconected issues, and yields a logically consistent collective view. The median rule is a judgement aggregation rule that selects the logically consistent view which minimizes the average distance to the views of the voters (where the “distance” between two views is the number of issues on which they disagree). In the special case of preference aggregation, this is called the Kemeny rule. We show that, under appropriate regularity conditions, the median rule is the unique judgement aggregation rule which satisfies three axioms: Ensemble Supermajority Efficiency, Reinforcement, and Continuity. Our analysis covers aggregation problems in which different issues have different weights, and in which the consistency restrictions on input and output judgments may differ.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  The median rule in judgement aggregation 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Judgement aggregation; majoritarian; reinforcement; consistency; median. 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations 
Item ID:  84258 
Depositing User:  Marcus Pivato 
Date Deposited:  03 Feb 2018 17:35 
Last Modified:  27 Sep 2019 11:49 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/84258 