Persichina, Marco (2016): Other-regarding Preferences and Social Norms in the Intergenerational Transfer of Renewable Resources when Agent has Present-Biased Preferences.
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Abstract
The paper analyses the effects of the present-bias in terms of reduction of the welfare of future generations in the framework of renewable resources harvesting. In particular, this study queries the behavioral traits that emerge when the agent is present-biased and also in presence of other-regarding preferences toward future generations, which are expressed through the adherence to genuine other-regarding preferences or social norms. This investigation demonstrates that the strategic short-sightedness imposed by the “dictatorship of the present” causes a reduction in the well-being of future generations, despite the existence of strong social preferences. Faced with this problem, this study argues that if the social preferences of the individuals are not left only and exclusively to their own spontaneous behavior, and if these social preferences are also expressed through social norms that prescribe to not reevaluate the harvesting decisions, a mitigation of the effect of present bias on the intergenerational equity can occur.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Other-regarding Preferences and Social Norms in the Intergenerational Transfer of Renewable Resources when Agent has Present-Biased Preferences |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Present bias, naive agent, intergenerational resource management, renewable resources, other-regarding preferences, social norms |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles D - Microeconomics > D9 - Intertemporal Choice > D90 - General D - Microeconomics > D9 - Intertemporal Choice > D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice ; Life Cycle Models and Saving Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q20 - General Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q50 - General |
Item ID: | 84277 |
Depositing User: | Marco Persichina |
Date Deposited: | 05 Feb 2018 14:24 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 12:01 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/84277 |
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