On Central Bank Transparency, Independence and Public Debt Policy

Efthimiadis, Tilemahos and Tsintzos, Panagiotis (2009): On Central Bank Transparency, Independence and Public Debt Policy. Published in: The Journal of World Economic Review , Vol. 2, No. 4 (2009): pp. 139-153.

Abstract

In this paper we examine the case of partial central bank transparency and the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions. In particular, we establish a relationship between central bank transparency and nominal debt and find that it depends on whether the public has (ex-ante) under or overestimated the preferences of the central banker. Furthermore, we analytically examine the relationship between central bank transparency and central bank conservativeness and find it positive.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Central bank transparency; Central bank independence; Nominal debt
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E50 - General; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies; H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H63 - Debt ; Debt Management ; Sovereign Debt

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