Munich Personal RePEc Archive

On Central Bank Transparency, Independence and Public Debt Policy

Efthimiadis, Tilemahos and Tsintzos, Panagiotis (2009): On Central Bank Transparency, Independence and Public Debt Policy. Published in: The Journal of World Economic Review , Vol. 2, No. 4 (2009): pp. 139-153.

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Abstract

In this paper we examine the case of partial central bank transparency and the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions. In particular, we establish a relationship between central bank transparency and nominal debt and find that it depends on whether the public has (ex-ante) under or overestimated the preferences of the central banker. Furthermore, we analytically examine the relationship between central bank transparency and central bank conservativeness and find it positive.

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