Chatterjee, Rittwik and Chattopadhyay, Srobonti and Kabiraj, Tarun (2018): Spillovers and R&D Incentive under Incomplete Information.
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Abstract
Spillovers of R&D outcome affect the R&D decision of a firm. The present paper discusses the R&D incentives of a firm when the extent of R&D spillover is private information to each firm. We construct a two stage game involving two firms when the firms first decide simultaneously whether to invest in R&D or not, then they compete in quantity. Assuming general distribution function of firm types we compare R&D incentives of firms under alternative scenarios based on different informational structures. The paper shows that while R&D spillovers reduce R&D incentives under complete information unambiguously, however, it can be larger under incomplete information.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Spillovers and R&D Incentive under Incomplete Information |
English Title: | Spillovers and R&D Incentive under Incomplete Information |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | R&D incentives, Cournot duopoly, Spillovers, Incomplete information |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives |
Item ID: | 85089 |
Depositing User: | Srobonti Chattopadhyay |
Date Deposited: | 11 Mar 2018 22:44 |
Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2019 10:39 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/85089 |