Schipper, Burkhard C (2018): Discovery and Equilibrium in Games with Unawareness.

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Abstract
Equilibrium notions for games with unawareness in the literature cannot be interpreted as steadystates of a learning process because players may discover novel actions during play. In this sense, many games with unawareness are ``selfdestroying'' as a player's representation of the game may change after playing it once. We define discovery processes where at each state there is an extensiveform game with unawareness that together with the players' play determines the transition to possibly another extensiveform game with unawareness in which players are now aware of actions that they have discovered. A discovery process is rationalizable if players play extensiveform rationalizable strategies in each game with unawareness. We show that for any game with unawareness there is a rationalizable discovery process that leads to a selfconfirming game that possesses a selfconfirming equilibrium in extensiveform rationalizable strategies. This notion of equilibrium can be interpreted as steadystate of both a discovery and learning process.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Discovery and Equilibrium in Games with Unawareness 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Selfconfirming equilibrium, conjectural equilibrium, extensiveform rationalizability, unawareness, extensiveform games, equilibrium, learning, discovery 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games D  Microeconomics > D8  Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83  Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness 
Item ID:  86300 
Depositing User:  Burkhard C Schipper 
Date Deposited:  20 Apr 2018 13:24 
Last Modified:  26 Sep 2019 13:49 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/86300 