Pulford, Briony D. and Colman, Andrew M. (2007): Ambiguous games: Evidence for strategic ambiguity aversion. Published in: Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology , Vol. 8, No. 60 (2007): pp. 10831100.

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Abstract
The problem of ambiguity in games is discussed, and a class of ambiguous games is identified. 195 participants played strategicform games of various sizes with unidentified coplayers. In each case, they first chose between a knownrisk game involving a coplayer indifferent between strategies and an equivalent ambiguous game involving one of several coplayer types, each with a different dominant strategy, then they chose a strategy for the preferred game. Half the players knew that the ambiguous coplayer types were equally likely, and half did not. Half expected the outcomes to be known immediately, and half expected a week’s delay. Knownrisk games were generally preferred, confirming a significant strategic ambiguity aversion effect. In the delay conditions, players who knew that the ambiguous coplayer types were equally likely were significantly less ambiguityaverse than those who did not. Decision confidence was significantly higher in 2 × 2 than larger games.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Ambiguous games: Evidence for strategic ambiguity aversion 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  ambiguity aversion; behavioural game theory; confidence; decision making; Ellsberg paradox; incomplete information; intolerance of uncertainty; psychological game theory; subjective expected utility. 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9  Design of Experiments > C90  General C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9  Design of Experiments > C92  Laboratory, Group Behavior D  Microeconomics > D8  Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81  Criteria for DecisionMaking under Risk and Uncertainty 
Item ID:  86345 
Depositing User:  Dr Briony D. Pulford 
Date Deposited:  02 May 2018 04:07 
Last Modified:  27 Sep 2019 09:58 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/86345 