Banks' Disclosure of Information and Financial Stability Regulations

Okahara, Naoto (2018): Banks' Disclosure of Information and Financial Stability Regulations.

Abstract

This study proposes a model that analyzes the interaction between a bank and its creditors. The bank uses short-term wholesale funding and the creditors decide whether to roll over their loan by using information about the bank. The model shows that, when the creditors become more reluctant to roll over their loans since the bank heavily depends on such a debt, the bank does not issue the short-term debt excessively and its privately optimal amount of the debt in this situation corresponds to the socially desirable one. This implies that a regulation requiring banks to disclose information about their capital structures can by itself contribute to stabilizing the financial system. However, the model also shows that in order to ensure the result we need an additional regulation that bridges the information gap between banks and creditors

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Short-term debt, Rollover risk, Macroprudential, Fire sales
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E50 - General

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