Monetary Constitutionalism: Some Recent Developments

Van Den Hauwe, Ludwig (2017): Monetary Constitutionalism: Some Recent Developments. Forthcoming in: Procesos de Mercado

Abstract

The volume edited by Leland Yeager more than 50 years ago and published in 1962 under the title In Search of a Monetary Constitution has turned out to be remarkably prescient since the Great Inflation was then about to begin. One might expect that in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession interest in monetary-constitutional matters would be revived and this has indeed been the case. In this paper an attempt is made to assess whether and to what extent scientific progress has been made in defining the nature and characteristics of a monetary constitution for the post-Crisis world. To that end some recent contributions to the literature are reviewed critically.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Monetary Systems, Monetary Constitution, Monetary Constitutionalism
• Subjects: A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A10 - General; B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B5 - Current Heterodox Approaches > B53 - Austrian; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E0 - General > E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E50 - General; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E66 - General Outlook and Conditions

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