Generalising Conflict Networks

Cortes-Corrales, Sebastián and Gorny, Paul M. (2018): Generalising Conflict Networks.

Abstract

We investigate the behaviour of agents in bilateral contests within arbitrary network structures when valuations and efficiencies are heterogenous. These parameters are interpreted as measures of strength. We provide conditions for when unique, pure strategy equilibria exist. When a player starts attacking one player more strongly, others join in on fighting the victim. Different efficiencies in fighting make players fight those of similar strength. Centrality of a player (having more enemies) makes a player weaker and her opponents are more likely to attack with more effort.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Contest, conflict, networks, games on networks
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory

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