Brañas-Garza, Pablo and Cabrales, Antonio and Mateu, Guillermo and Sanchez, Angel and Sutan, Angela (2018): Does pre-play social interaction improve negotiation outcomes?
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Abstract
We study experimentally the impact of pre-play social interactions on negotiations. These interactions are often complex. Thus, we attempt to isolate the impact of several of its more common components: conversations, food, and beverages, which could be alcoholic or non-alcoholic. To do this, our subjects take part in a standardized negotiation (complex and simple) under six conditions: without interaction, interaction only, and interactions with water, wine, water and food and wine and food. We find that none of the treatments improve the outcomes over the treatment without interactions. We also study trust and reciprocity in the same context. For all-male groups, we find the same lack of superiority of interaction treatments over no interaction. For all-female groups, some very simple social interactions have a positive impact on trust.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Does pre-play social interaction improve negotiation outcomes? |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | negotiation, trust, business meals, social interactions, alcohol. |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I1 - Health > I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M1 - Business Administration > M11 - Production Management |
Item ID: | 90842 |
Depositing User: | Prof. Pablo Branas-Garza |
Date Deposited: | 26 Dec 2018 09:10 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 14:33 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/90842 |