Munich Personal RePEc Archive

On the political economy of income taxation

Berliant, Marcus and Gouveia, Miguel (2019): On the political economy of income taxation.

[img] PDF
MPRA_paper_92528.pdf

Download (272kB)

Abstract

The literatures dealing with voting, optimal income taxation, implementation, and pure public goods are integrated here to address the problem of voting over income taxes and public goods. In contrast with previous articles, general nonlinear income taxes that affect the labor-leisure decisions of consumers who work and vote are allowed. Uncertainty plays an important role in that the government does not know the true realizations of the abilities of consumers drawn from a known distribution, but must meet the realization-dependent budget. Even though the space of alternatives is infinite dimensional, conditions on primitives are found to assure existence of a majority rule equilibrium when agents vote over both a public good and income taxes to finance it.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.