Mitra, Manipushpak and De, Parikshit (2015): Incentives and justice for sequencing problems.
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Abstract
We address the mechanism design issue for the sequencing problem. We identify the just sequencing rule that serves the agents in the nonincreasing order of their waiting costs and prove that it is a Rawlsian rule. We identify all rVCG mechanisms that implement the just sequencing rule. The other properties of the just sequencing rule that we identify are the following. It is an affine cost minimizer. It can be implemented with budget balanced rVCG mechanisms. Finally, when waiting cost and processing time are private information, we identify all generalized rVCG mechanisms that expost implement the just sequencing rule.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Incentives and justice for sequencing problems. 
English Title:  Incentives and justice for sequencing problems. 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  sequencing, implementation, outcome efficient sequencing rule, just sequencing rule, budget balance, expost implementation. 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games D  Microeconomics > D6  Welfare Economics > D63  Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D  Microeconomics > D8  Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82  Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design 
Item ID:  92865 
Depositing User:  PARIKSHIT DE 
Date Deposited:  22 Mar 2019 21:14 
Last Modified:  29 Sep 2019 21:53 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/92865 
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Incentives and justice for sequencing problems. (deposited 07 Jul 2015 04:24)
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