Price distortions and public information: theory, experiments and simulations

Ruiz-Buforn, Alba and Alfarano, Simone and Camacho-Cuena, Eva (2019): Price distortions and public information: theory, experiments and simulations.

Abstract

This paper studies the effects on the asset price of the introduction of a public signal in the presence of asymmetric private information in a decentralized market. We introduce an artificial market model populated by boundedly rational agents with heterogeneous levels of reasoning: sophisticated and naive traders. The model captures the main impacts of public information analyzed in the laboratory experiments reported by Ruiz-Buforn et al. (2019). Public information, when correct, coordinates market activity, improving price convergence to the fundamentals. By contrast, unwarranted public information pushes prices away from fundamentals. This strong influence of public information on prices is primarily driven by its common knowledge property.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Public information; asset markets; asymmetric information
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C90 - General; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G10 - General

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