Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Internal migration and public policy

Giuranno, Michele G. and Rongili, Biswas (2012): Internal migration and public policy.

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This paper studies the relation between internal migration and public spending on public goods. We describe centralized public policy when a central government is comprised of elected representatives from local electoral districts. Internal migration determines the median voter in the districts. The median voters decide the equilibrium policy through bargaining. We find the conditions under which voters' mobility results in larger or smaller public spending. Furthermore, the distance between the actual size and the efficient size of government spending depends on the way internal migration changes the distribution of income within and between districts.

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