Guerrazzi, Marco and Giribone, Pier Giuseppe (2019): The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts.
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Abstract
In this paper, we explore the out-of-equilibrium dynamics of working hours and wages in a model economy where workers and firms have agreed upon an implicit contract that smooths long-run consumption. Specifically, we analyse a deterministic and a stochastic framework in which a firm inter-temporally sets its level of labour utilization by considering that workers' earnings tend to adjust in the direction of a fixed level that seeks to stabilize their consumption. Without any uncertainty in labour effectiveness, this theoretical setting may have one, two or no stationary solution. The dynamics of the deterministic economy, however, can be assessed only in the two-solution case and it reveals that wages move counter-cyclically towards the allocation preferred by the firm. Adding uncertainty in labour effectiveness does not overturn the counter-cyclical pattern of wages but is helpful in explaining the wage stickiness observed at the macro level.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Implicit contract theory; Consumption smoothing; Out-of-equilibrium dynamics; Optimal Control |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy > E24 - Employment ; Unemployment ; Wages ; Intergenerational Income Distribution ; Aggregate Human Capital ; Aggregate Labor Productivity J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J41 - Labor Contracts |
Item ID: | 95978 |
Depositing User: | Prof. Marco Guerrazzi |
Date Deposited: | 12 Sep 2019 16:58 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 11:58 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/95978 |