The Financing Dilemma Supporting a Project

Mullat, Joseph (2019): The Financing Dilemma Supporting a Project.

Abstract

In this note, we will deal with one of the simplest cases of player-formed coalitions, all of which can be considered as “outstanding” in terms of bounded rationality. Bounded rationality is the idea that rational decision making of people is limited by people’s irrational nature. We focused on special coalitions, called "Kernels", that have an advantage over the remaining, due to yielding higher contribution of each individual participant.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: coalition, game, contribution, donation, monotonic, project
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C5 - Econometric Modeling > C51 - Model Construction and Estimation; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C5 - Econometric Modeling > C53 - Forecasting and Prediction Methods ; Simulation Methods; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games

References

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