Is government budget constraint binding?

Kim, Minseong (2019): Is government budget constraint binding?

Abstract

A common question against macroeconomics of public debts is: why should one think government budget constraint is binding when government, at least technically, can print out money to pay for debts. Out of compatible answers, we explore an answer that is not usually invoked. While in OLG models, government bonds can successfully exist as rational bubbles, concerns of time consistency leave trade-offs in exploiting breakdown of the economy-wise public debt transversality condition. Government budget constraint is one of most certain means to fight time consistency issues and ensure that market stability is achieved.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: government budget constraint; transversality condition
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E1 - General Aggregative Models > E13 - Neoclassical; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E4 - Money and Interest Rates > E42 - Monetary Systems ; Standards ; Regimes ; Government and the Monetary System ; Payment Systems; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy ; Stabilization ; Treasury Policy

References

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