Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Social Welfare in Search Games with Asymmetric Information

Bavly, Gilad and Heller, Yuval and Schreiber, Amnon (2020): Social Welfare in Search Games with Asymmetric Information.

There is a more recent version of this item available.
[thumbnail of MPRA_paper_98838.pdf]

Download (1MB) | Preview


We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize's location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that yields the first-best payoff (i.e., the highest social payoff under any strategy profile), and we characterize the first-best payoff. The results have interesting implications for innovation contests and R&D races.

Available Versions of this Item

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact us: mpra@ub.uni-muenchen.de

This repository has been built using EPrints software.

MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by Logo of the University Library LMU Munich.