Parasitstatens logik: Et Leviathan-perspektiv på danske regeringers økonomiske politik

Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (2019): Parasitstatens logik: Et Leviathan-perspektiv på danske regeringers økonomiske politik. Published in: Libertas No. 70 (2019): pp. 24-35.

Abstract

Betyder regeringsfarve noget for, hvor hurtigt den offentlige sektor vokser? Vi skitserer en Leviathan-inspireret model, hvor statens formål er at maksimere indkomst, og hvor implikationen er, at enhver velstandsvækst i samfundet derfor vil blive forsøgt ’spist’ af politikerne: Hvis der ikke er økonomisk vækst, vil der ikke blive brugt flere penge, men heller ikke foretaget realbesparelser; hvis der er økonomisk vækst, der sender flere indtægter i statskassen, vil de blive brugt. Perspektivet anvendes på danske regeringer 1947-2013, med fokus på realvæksten i samfundsøkonomi og skatter snarere end skattetryk. En statistisk analyse antyder, at regeringsfarve og andre politiske faktorer er uden robust betydning. Den væsentligste faktor er udviklingen i velstand: Når der er vækst i samfundsøkonomien, beslaglægger vækst i skatterne et sted mellem 50 og 100 pct. af fremgangen.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: The logic of the parasite state: A Leviathan perspective on the economic policies of Danish governments
• Language: Danish
• Keywords: Government growth; prospserity; Leviathan.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods; H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development; P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P10 - General

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