Leadership by Confidence in Teams

Kobayashi, Hajime and Suehiro, Hideo (2008): Leadership by Confidence in Teams.

Abstract

We study endogenous signaling in teams by analyzing a team production problem with endogenous timing. Each agent of the team is privately endowed with some level of confidence about team productivity. Each of them must then commit a level of effort in one of two periods. At the end of each period, each agent observes his partner's move in this period. Both agents are rewarded by a team output determined by team productivity and total invested effort. Each agent must personally incur the cost of effort that he invested. We show a sufficient condition under which sender and receiver emerge endogenously in a stable equilibrium. This result implies that leadership in teams emerges through the leader's signaling incentives only based on his confidence.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Endogenous Signaling, Team Production, Leadership
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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