The environmental effect of ambient charges in mixed triopoly with diverse firm objectives

Ohnishi, Kazuhiro (2021): The environmental effect of ambient charges in mixed triopoly with diverse firm objectives.

Abstract

This paper examines a quantity-setting mixed triopoly model comprising a profit-maximizing firm, a partially cooperating firm and a socially concerned firm to reassess the environmental effect of an increase in ambient charges. The paper demonstrates that an increase in the ambient charge can reduce pollutant emissions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: ambient charge; Cournot triopoly; partially cooperating firm; pollution; socially concerned firm
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q58 - Government Policy

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