Disjointly and jointly productive players and the Shapley value

Besner, Manfred (2021): Disjointly and jointly productive players and the Shapley value.

Abstract

Central to this study is the concept of disjointly productive players where no cooperation gain occurs when one of two such players joins a coalition containing the other. Our first new axiom states that the payoff to a player does not change when another player, disjointly productive to that player, leaves the game. The second axiom implies that the payoff to a third player does not change if we merge two disjointly productive players into a new player. These two axioms, along with efficiency, characterize the Shapley value and may be advantageous sometimes to improve the runtime for computing the Shapley value. Further axiomatizations are provided, using, for example, a modification of behavior property where the payoff for two players in two new games in which their behavior changes once to total dislike and once to total affection is equal to the payoff in the original game.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Cooperative game; Shapley value; Disjointly productive players; Mutually dependent players; Merged (disjointly productive) players game; Modification of behavior
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games

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