Bergantiños, Gustavo and Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. (2021): Broadcasting revenue sharing after cancelling sports competitions.
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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic forced the partial or total cancellation of most sports competitions worldwide. Sports organizations crucially rely on revenues raised from broadcasting. How should the allocation of these revenues be modified when sports leagues are cancelled? We aim to answer that question in this paper by means of the axiomatic approach.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Broadcasting revenue sharing after cancelling sports competitions |
English Title: | Broadcasting revenue sharing after cancelling sports competitions |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | C71, D63, Z20 |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games |
Item ID: | 109736 |
Depositing User: | Gustavo Bergantiño |
Date Deposited: | 18 Sep 2021 14:06 |
Last Modified: | 18 Sep 2021 14:07 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/109736 |