Information collection in bargaining

Li, Ming (2002): Information collection in bargaining.

Abstract

I analyze a bilateral bargaining model with one-sided uncertainty about time preferences. The uninformed player has the option of halting the bargaining process to obtain additional information, when it is his turn to offer. For a wide class of preference settings, the uninformed player does not collect information when he is quite sure about his opponent’s type. There exist preference settings in which the uninformed player collects information until he is sufficiently sure about his opponent’s type, as long as the information source is accurate enough. With additional assumptions, the uninformed player is more likely to draw signals and is better off, if the information is more accurate.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: bargaining, alternate offers, incomplete information, delay
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design

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