When consensus hurts: experts' advice and electoral support

De Moragas, Antoni-Italo (2020): When consensus hurts: experts' advice and electoral support.

Abstract

In this paper, I analyze how voters optimally aggregate and use the information provided by informed experts. I find that, when citizens do not observe the vested interest of each expert and their interests are sufficiently correlated, the relationship between the share of experts endorsing an alternative and the share of citizens voting for it is non-monotonic. The explanation is that consensus among experts can be reached either because all experts share the same information or because they ignore the information they have and provide their advice according to their interests. The non-monotonic result holds even if experts are strategic.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Voting; Experts; Consensus.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations

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