Counter-Terrorism Efforts by Government in case of hostage taking by negotiation and bargaining: A Game Theoretic Analysis

HARICHANDAN, AISHWARYA (2022): Counter-Terrorism Efforts by Government in case of hostage taking by negotiation and bargaining: A Game Theoretic Analysis.

Abstract

This paper talks about the short term and long-term terrorist and the scenario of hostage taking. It takes into consideration whether the government should negotiate with them or not. It goes on to look into the expenditure by government on anti-terrorist activities depending upon the incidence of attacks and the political stability.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Counter-terrorism; Game Theory; Government; Private players; Vigilance; Complements; Substitutes.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; Z - Other Special Topics > Z0 - General > Z00 - General

References

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