Последовательные труэли: равновесие с выживанием сильнейшего

Dmitry, Ilinskiy and Sergey, Izmalkov and Alexey, Savvateev (2022): Последовательные труэли: равновесие с выживанием сильнейшего.

Abstract

A sequential truel is a generalisation of duel. This type of games is known because of the «survival of the weakest» paradox, where weakest player have the highest probability of survival. We analyse a typical variation of this model, in which players are allowed to shoot in the air. We show that there exists a SPE-equilibrium, where the strongest player, against the paradox statement, has the highest probability of survival.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Sequential Truels: an equilibrium with the survival of the fittest
• Language: Russian
• Keywords: truel; SPE; survival of the weakest
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games

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