On the viability of potentially divided multi-ethnic states

Kyriacou, Andreas (2001): On the viability of potentially divided multi-ethnic states. Published in: Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice , Vol. 19, No. 1 : pp. 39-53.

Abstract

This paper examines the viability of inter-ethnic co-operation from the perspective afforded by the economic approach to institutional analysis. Four factors are seen to affect viability namely, the relative strength of each ethnic group in the non co-operative setting, the perceived fairness of the terms of co-operation, the continuing influence of informal rules which may be inimical to co-operation and finally, the judicial enforcement and legislative maintenance of the terms of co-operation. The discussion generates a number of insights into the desirable nature of the institutions of potentially divided multi-ethnic states.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: institutional viability or maintenance; conflict resolution
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions

References

Brennan, G. – BUCHANAN, J., 1985, The Reason of Rules. Constitutional Political Economy, Cambridge University Press.

Brennan, G. – PARDO, J. C., 1991, «A Reading of the Spanish Constitution», Constitutional Political Economy 2(1), pp. 53-79.

Buchanan, J., 1990, «The Domain of Constitutional Economics», Constitutional Political Economy 1(1): 1-18.

Buchanan, J., 1977, Freedom in Constitutional Contract, College Station and London: Texas A&M University Press.

Buchanan, J., 1975, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan, Chicago, Chicago University Press.

Buchanan, J. – TULLOCK, G., 1962, The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, University of Michigan Press.

Bush, W., 1972, «Individual Welfare in Anarchy», in Tullock, G. (ed.), Explorations into the Theory of Anarchy, Blacksburg VA, Center for the Study of Public Choice, pp.5-18.

Fearon, J. – LAITIN, D., 1996, «Explaining Interethnic Cooperation», American Political Science Review 90(4), pp. 715-733.

Friedmann, M., 1962, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago and London: Chicago University Press.

Gurr, T., 2000, «Ethnic Warfare on the Wane», Foreign Affairs 79(3), pp. 52-64.

Hardin, R., 1995, One for All. The Logic of Group Conflict, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

Hechter, M., 2000, Containing Nationalism, Oxford University Press.

Kyriacou, A., 1998, «A Comment of Müller’s “Unveiling of the Veil of Uncertainty”», Constitutional Political Economy 9(4), pp. 335-338.

Kyriacou, A., 1999, The Constitutional Political Economy of a Reunified Cyprus, Ph.D. Thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

Kyriacou, A., 2000a, «An Ethnically Based Federal and Bicameral System: The Case of Cyprus», International Review of Law and Economics 20(2), pp. 261-268.

Kyriacou, A., 2000b, «A Just and Viable Solution to the Cyprus Problem: In Search of Institutional Viability», Mediterranean Politics 5(3), pp. 54-75.

Luphart, A., 1977, Democracies in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration. Yale University Press.

Lowenberg, A. – Yu, B., 1992, «Efficient Constitutional Formation and Maintenance. The Role of “Exit”», Constitutional Political Economy 3(1), pp. 51-72.

Mueller, D., 1991, «Constitutional Rights», Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7(2), pp. 313-333.

Mueller, D., 1996, Constitutional Democracy, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Niskanen, W., 1990, «Conditions Affecting the Survival of Constitutional Rules», Constitutional Political Economy 1(2), pp. 53-62.

North, D., 1981, Structure and Change in Economic History, New York, London, W. W. Norton and Company.

North, D., 1987, «Rent-Seeking and the New Institutional Economics», in Rowley, C. (ed.), Democracy and Public Choice. Essays in Honour of Gordon Tullock, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.163-167.

North, D., 1988, «Ideology and Political/Economic Institutions». Cato Journal 8(1), pp. 15-28.

North, D., 1990, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

North, D., 1994, «Economic Performance Through Time», American Economic Review 84(3), pp. 359-368.

Olson, M., 1984, «Comment», in McKenzie, R. (ed.), Constitutional Economics. Containing the Economic Power of Government, Lexington Books, pp.89-94.

Ordeshook, P., (1992). «Constitutional Stability», Constitutional Political Economy 3, pp. 137-175.

Pejovich, S., 1996, «Law, Tradition and Liberalism in Practice: Quo Vadis Eastern Europe», Economia delle Scelte Pubbliche 14(1), pp. 3-13.

Roback, J., 1989, «Racism as Rent Seeking», Economic Inquiry 27, pp. 661-681.

Snyder, J., 2000, From Voting to Violence. Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, New York and London, W.W. Norton and Company.

Sunstein, C., 1991, «Constitutionalism and Secession», University of Chicago Law Review 58, pp. 633-670.

Tullock, G., 1974, The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution, Blacksburg VA, Center for the Study of Public Choice.

Tullock, G., 1985, «Adam Smith and the Prisoner’s Dilemma», Quarterly Journal of Economics 100, pp. 1073-1081.

Wagner, R., 1993, «Parchment, Guns and Constitutional Order», The Shaftesbury Papers 3, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.