Out of Office, Out of Step? Re-election Concners and Ideological Shirking in Lame Duck Sessions of the U.S. House of Representatives

Schönenberger, Felix (2024): Out of Office, Out of Step? Re-election Concners and Ideological Shirking in Lame Duck Sessions of the U.S. House of Representatives.

Abstract

Do elections constrain incumbent politicians’ policy choices? To answer this longstanding question, this paper proposes a novel identification strategy to separate electoral incentives from selection effects. Taking advantage of the unique setup of lame-duck sessions in the U.S. Congress, where lame-duck incumbents who lost re-election vote on the same issues as their re-elected colleagues, I use a close election regression discontinuity design to exploit quasirandom assignment of re-election seeking representatives to lame-duck status, which is orthogonal to voter preferences and incumbents’ type. Comparing within-incumbent changes in roll call voting of barely unseated lame ducks to narrowly re-elected co-partisans serving the same congressional term, I find that lame ducks revert to more extreme positions with lame-duck Democrats (Republicans) voting more liberally (conservatively). Consistent with lame ducks’ loss of re-election incentives driving the result, the effect of lame-duck status on roll call extremism is more pronounced among ex-ante more vulnerable legislators. I also consider, but ultimately dismiss, several other mechanisms including emotional backlash, logrolling motives, party control, and selective abstention.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Elections, Accountability, Legislator Behavior, Polarization
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets; P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy

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