(Lack of) Competition, Coordination, and Information Sharing in the Pork Industry: United States, 2009-2020

Donna, Javier and Walsh, Anita (2022): (Lack of) Competition, Coordination, and Information Sharing in the Pork Industry: United States, 2009-2020. Published in: Antitrust Bulletin , Vol. 1, No. 68 (2023): pp. 117-136.

Abstract

In 2020, an antitrust lawsuit was filed against the Pork Integrators alleging a §1 Sherman Act violation. At the center of the Lawsuit, there is an alleged exchange of atomistic information about the Pork integrators’ operations using Agri Stats, Inc. as a clearinghouse. We use the Su-preme Court benchmark in American Column & Lumber to discuss two questions that arise from the Lawsuit. The first is whether the association of Pork Integrators and Agri Stats, Inc. resulted in the restraint of interstate commerce, the main specific issue at stake in the pork Law-suit. The second is whether information-exchange agreements using clearinghouses like Agri Stats, Inc. lessen competition and offend United States antitrust law, a more general issue be-yond the pork Lawsuit. We find that there appears to be ample evidence in the Lawsuit to merit prosecution regarding both trade restraints and information-sharing agreements. We conclude by discussing the role of the Agencies in setting the standards in information-exchange agreements.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Antitrust, Price-fixing, Competition, Information Sharing, Cartel, Pork Industry
• Subjects: K - Law and Economics > K1 - Basic Areas of Law > K12 - Contract Law; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K21 - Antitrust Law; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L12 - Monopoly ; Monopolization Strategies; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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