Gayle, Philip and Faheem, Adeel (2024): Post and Hold Regulation and Competitive Conduct: Evidence from the U.S. Beer Industry. Forthcoming in: International Journal of Industrial Organization
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Abstract
The literature argues that Post and Hold (PH) laws facilitate tacit collusive price-setting behavior among suppliers of alcoholic beverages. Yet there is no explicit empirical test of this claim. We specify and estimate a structural model designed to identify the extent to which PH laws induce tacit collusive price-setting behavior among beer suppliers. Our estimates reveal evidence of PH law-induced collusive behavior that causes higher prices and lower consumption. Furthermore, we find that an alcohol content tax as a replacement for PH regulation yields the highest surplus to consumers compared to a sales tax or the PH regulation.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Post and Hold Regulation and Competitive Conduct: Evidence from the U.S. Beer Industry |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Post and Hold Regulation; Competitive Conduct; US Beer Industry; Externality; Corrective Tax Policy |
Subjects: | H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I1 - Health > I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health K - Law and Economics > K0 - General > K00 - General L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L40 - General L - Industrial Organization > L6 - Industry Studies: Manufacturing > L66 - Food ; Beverages ; Cosmetics ; Tobacco ; Wine and Spirits |
Item ID: | 122541 |
Depositing User: | Dr Philip Gayle |
Date Deposited: | 05 Nov 2024 23:21 |
Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2024 23:21 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/122541 |