Response to "A note on Brandl and Brandt's axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium"

Brandl, Florian and Brandt, Felix (2025): Response to "A note on Brandl and Brandt's axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium".

Abstract

Schroeder (2025) claims that the solution concept, which, for each n-player game, returns the set of all strategy profiles where each player's strategy has full support, constitutes a counter-example to the characterization by Brandl and Brandt (2024). We show that this is not true because this solution concept violates consequentialism.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Commentary on: Schroeder, Andreas (2024): A note on Brandl and Brandt’s axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium.
• Language: English
• Keywords: Nash equilibrium, axiomatic characterization
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

References

Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt. An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium. Theoretical Economics, 19(4):1473–1504, 2024.

Andreas Schroeder. A note on Brandl and Brandt’s axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium. Technical Report 123069, MPRA, posted 01 Jan 2025.