Ohnishi, Kazuhiro (2025): Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a partially foreign-owned competitor.
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Abstract
An existing study examines an international mixed duopoly involving a state-owned public firm and a foreign private firm, focusing on their timing choices for quantities and showing that the state-owned public firm should act as the leader. This result differs from that for an endogenous-timing mixed duopoly model where a state-owned public firm coexists with a domestic private firm. We investigate the endogenous order of moves in a mixed duopoly model where a state-owned public firm competes with a private firm that is partially foreign-owned. Specifically, we explore the desirable role of the state-owned public firm, either as a leader or a follower, and present the equilibrium outcome of the model. Our findings reveal that the equilibrium differs depending on whether the foreign ownership ratio of the private firm is low or high.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a partially foreign-owned competitor |
English Title: | Stackelberg mixed duopoly with a partially foreign-owned competitor |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Endogenous timing; Mixed oligopoly; Partial foreign ownership; Stackelberg |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory F - International Economics > F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business > F23 - Multinational Firms ; International Business L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L32 - Public Enterprises ; Public-Private Enterprises |
Item ID: | 124662 |
Depositing User: | Dr. Kazuhiro Ohnishi |
Date Deposited: | 02 May 2025 14:52 |
Last Modified: | 02 May 2025 14:52 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/124662 |